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Abstract. This study investigates characteristics of Rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs) participants who join the association due to its Pareto superior allocation in 
Ghana. Some scholars like Dejene and Van den Brink have hypothesized that people join 
ROSCAs because of its Pareto superior allocation. The study employed primary data 
analysis in achieving its main objective.  Out of the 400 ROSCA participants sampled for the 
study from Asunafo North Municipality of Ghana, 71.75% joined the association because of 
its Pareto superior allocation. A Probit model was used to predict the probability of joining 
the association due to its superior allocation. The dependent variable took the value of one 
when respondents join the association due to its superior allocation and zero if otherwise. 
Married participants, participants with no or low level of education, participants who are 
unemployed and participants who save more of their income are more likely to join ROSCA 
due to its Pareto superior allocation. It was recommended that that ROSCA participants 
who have access (participants living in urban sectors) to formal financial institutions, 
participants who have accounts at formal financial institutions, participants who are rich 
and aged participants should be educated on how ROSCA constitutes its Pareto superior 
allocation. 
Keywords. Pareto Superiority, Rotating Savings and Credit Association. 
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1. Introduction 
nformal financial sectors dominate in developing countries than formal 
financial sectors (Aryeetey & Hyuha, 1990). Formal financial sectors 
consist of categories of stocks containing firms that offer financial 
services to commercial and retail customers. Examples include banks, 
investment fund, insurance companies and real estate. Informal financial 
sectors, on the other hand, consist of those, often unrecorded, activities that 
take place outside official financial institutions. It must be noted that these 
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sectors are legal but unregulated. Among money lending, Susu collection, 
Accumulated savings and credit associations (ASCRAs) etc., rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) are one of the major informal 
financial sectors one can think of. A more general definition of ROSCA was 
given by Shirley Ardener as "an association formed upon a core of 
participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund which is 
given, in whole or in part, to each contributor in a rotation" (Ardener, 1964).   
 
2. Background of the study  
 The root of Rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA) was traced 
by Geertz (1962) from the regions of West Africa countries that were 
economically developed during the slave trade era into the Caribbean and 
the southern part of the United States. According to Ardener, ROSCA 
operated in Japan as far back as the thirteenth century (1275 AD). Handa & 
Kirton (1999) on the other hand reported that ROSCAs in Jamaica also 
called ‘Jamaica partner' rooted from the slaves from Africa who used it as a 
device to purchase their freedom. Poole & Grant (2006) indicated that, 
during the slave trade era, slaves from West Africa were found using a type 
of financial savings mechanism called Susu, which is a form of Rotating 
savings and credit association (ROSCA). 
The term rotating savings and credit association was coined by Geertz 
(1962). According to him, earlier scholars have used many terms to describe 
the association. Among which include, contribution clubs, slates, mutual 
lending societies, pooling clubs, thrift groups, and friendly societies. 
ROSCA is the most dominant form of informal financial institution in most 
developing economies (Besley et al., 1993). It is called Susu in Ghana, esusu 
in Liberia and Nigeria, osusu in Gambia, asusu in Sierra Leone, and ndjonu 
in Benin, arisan in Indonesia, yao hui in China, tontine in Cameroon and 
Senegal, equbs in Ethiopia, huis in Vietnam, and finally, keh in Korea   
(Bouman, 1995).    
There is a slight distinction between the general term Susu and ROSCA 
as used in Ghana. Susu is a term used for informal financial activities such 
as Susu collection scheme, ROSCAs, ASCRAs etc. Susu is one of the oldest 
traditional way of banking in Ghana. The term Susu in the Akan language 
means ‚small small‛. This indicates savings made on daily, weekly or 
monthly basis by those economically active poor people. Particularly Susu 
collection scheme is a form of ‚small small‛ saving up whereby a person 
decides to contribute on daily basis to another person (the Susu collector) 
for an agreed period of time usually a month. Here the collector is 
remunerated with a fee. ROSCA, on the other hand, is a form or a subset of 
the general term ‚Susu‛ used in Ghana.   
ROSCAs are found almost in every part of the world, but research 
shows that they are highly dominated in the rural areas of developing 
economies where citizens do not have enough access to formal financial 
institutions such as Banks (Besley et al., 1990).  Besley et al., (1990) proposed 
that the main aim of these institutions is to save up for the purpose of 
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buying durable indivisible goods such as bicycles or to provide financial 
support to major events such as weddings.  
Basically, there are two forms of ROSCAs. These are the random 
ROSCAs and the bidding ROSCAs. Besley et al., (1990), defined random 
ROSCAs by saying that "In a random ROSCA, members commit to putting 
a fixed sum of money into a ‘pot' for each period of the life of the ROSCA. 
Lots are being drawn and the pot is randomly allocated to one member in 
the group. In the next period, the process repeats itself, except the previous 
winner is excluded from the draw for the pot. The process continues, with 
every past winner excluded, until each member of the ROSCA has received 
the pot once. At this point, the ROSCA is either disbanded or begins again  
Besley et al., (1990)". They went ahead and defined bidding ROSCA as one 
that allocates the pot by using bidding procedures. Thus the participant 
who obtains the pot in the current period does so by bidding higher. For 
instance, pledging higher future contributions to the ROSCA or one-time 
payment to the other members.  
The most common form of ROSCA in Ghana is the random ROSCA. 
ROSCAs are the source of fund and capital formation for most of the small-
scale enterprises and especially market women and petty traders in Ghana. 
It can play an active role in the development of the Ghanaian economy if 
the government gives the necessary avenue for the operation of the sector 
(Owusu et al., 2013). ‘This is because the Ghanaian economy is highly 
dominated by small and medium scale enterprises and therefore can 
develop the economy through import substitution industrialization 
strategies’ (Owusu et al., 2013). According to Aryeetey & Steel (1995), 
rotating savings and credit associations are mostly practiced by petty 
traders. ‚Many traders and market women in Ghana use ROSCAs to 
expand their businesses‛ (Aryeetey & Gockel, 1991). Also, some office 
workers in the urban areas of Ghana have developed an interest in ROSCA 
participation.  
SMEs ability to access funding within the formal sectors in Ghana has 
become a challenge. The challenge affects the smooth running of businesses 
in the SMEs. The challenge stems from the fact that access to services of 
formal financial institutions requires documented rules such as valid 
collateral security, residential documents etc. For instance, many formal 
financial institutions require that any of its clients who come for a loan 
must have a collateral security, which ensures excludability of these petty 
traders from the operations of formal financial services.  
 Although there has been an introduction of savings and loans 
companies and microfinance companies, these companies fail to deliver 
effectively in an attempt of helping these petty traders. Some of the factors 
that cause their breakdown in their attempt of delivery, especially 
microfinance institutions include the high rate of interest on their 
investment packages which eventually collapse the institutions. Owners are 
being forced to escape with the available fund in their coffers and also 
overtrading by the microfinance institutions collapse the microfinance 
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institutions (Antwi, 2015). As an alternative, rotating savings and credit 
associations has become an instrument for these SMEs in raising funds to 
support their operations.   
According to the round six of the Ghana living standards survey 
(GLSS6) main report, the proportion of urban households which save 
through Susu (which is a form of ROSCA, Poole & Grant, 2006) in Ghana 
are 54.91% with Accra having only 9.1% and 45.8% goes to the other urban 
centres in Ghana. 45.1% of those in the rural areas save through Susu. 
Those in the rural coastal constitute 4.2%, whereas 30.9% of people in rural 
forest saves through Susu and finally, 10.0% of people in rural Savannah 
save through Susu. This gives clear evidence that people in urban areas are 
more likely to save through Susu (ROSCA included) in Ghana. In Accra, 
3.8% had their loans from Susu and 23.4% in other urban centres had their 
loans from Susu. In rural coastal, 23.4% had their loans from Susu whereas 
10.4% of the rural forest had their loan from Susu and finally, 14.7% of the 
rural savannah had their loan from Susu. With regards to sex, 4.5% of 
males obtain their loans from Susu and 11.3% of females obtain their loan 
from Susu.  
Let's take for instance a group of five school teachers who have agreed 
to enter into a ROSCA, with the aim of buying bicycles to help them reduce 
their lateness to school. The cost of their choices of the bicycle is Five 
Hundred Ghana Cedis. Let's assume further that, the monthly salary of 
each teacher is one hundred Ghana cedis. So, it means for a teacher to own 
a bicycle, it will take him/her five months of saving his/her salary (saving 
alone), deposit his/her monthly income at a bank against an interest and 
going for an interest-bearing loan from a bank. But if they enter into a 
ROSCA, all the teachers except the last person on the rank would receive 
their bicycle before the end of the fifth month. At least four of these 
teachers will prefer ROSCA to the other forms of financial intermediation 
except the last person who will be indifferent between saving alone and 
joining the ROSCA. Also with reference to the formal intermediation, they 
will prefer ROSCA since it does not come with any interest on credit.  
In the above example, it can be seen clearly that ROSCA enables each of 
its members to acquire his/her indivisible good (bicycle) within the shortest 
possible time. Besley et al., (1990) postulated that ROSCA sequentially gives 
solutions to the lumpy problems of each individual in the association. It 
also shortens the time period each individual would wait in case they were 
to save alone, except the last person on the rotation. Since all the ROSCA 
participants with the exception of the last person on the rank are liable in 
receiving the pot sooner, the average cost of ROSCA fund may be 
competitive even for people who have access to credit from formal financial 
institutions (Brink & Chavas, 1991). Hence all these participants will be 
strictly better off for being a member of the association with the exception 
of the last person, who will be indifferent between joining the association 
and saving alone. Hence ROSCA constitutes a Pareto superior allocation 
(Besley et al., 1990).  
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If we take a critical look at the ROSCA carefully, we realize that all the 
ROSCA participants (with the exception of the last one on the rotation) 
obtain advance money that they will repay through their contributions 
during the circle. The first person to receive the contributions (rank one in 
the order of rotation) receives the maximum credit that he/she pays back in 
the subsequent contributions. The last person in the other of rotation 
receives no credit and saves throughout the circle.   
The basic principle of ROSCA is the same on every continent. ‚It exists 
in at least three continents (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) and within 
very different communities‛ (Bouman, 1977). Despite the manifest 
importance of ROSCA, there has been little literature on ROSCA in the 
economics field. Reason being that the importance of such institution is not 
well understood. Microeconomist sees ROSCA as an informal credit market 
that is not competitive. On the other hand, among macroeconomists, they 
are sometimes assumed to be perfectly competitive. Also since the entire 
institution is governed by mutual trust, in a situation where a member is 
not so credit-worthy, his/her participation is discouraged. Again, 
‚arrangement used by associations that have bearing on defaults is a 
provision by which members can contribute less to the fund of members 
they consider to be relatively poor risks‛(Miracle et al., 1980).  
There is a hypothesis that ROSCA as an institution gives Pareto superior 
allocation in a society where there exist fragmentation in the capital market 
(Dejene, 1993).  The superiority comes in as the waiting time to buy durable 
indivisible good reduces. So many people will join the association because 
of its Pareto superior allocation. This thesis develops a new argument on 
the characteristics of ROSCAs participants who join the association due to 
its Pareto superior allocation.  
 
3. Theoretical underpinnings on ROSCAs  
3.1. Contending hypothesis about the motives for joining ROSCA 
Dejene (1993) hypothesized that ROSCA as an institution gives Pareto 
superior allocation in a society where there is fragmentation in the capital 
market. The superiority comes in as the waiting time to buy an indivisible 
good reduces. Anderson et al., (2009) used the term ‘early pot motive’ as the 
motive for joining ROSCA for the early purchase of indivisible goods. 
Theoretically, models that explain the great abundance of rotating savings 
and credit associations were developed by Besley, Coate, & Loury (1992, 
1993). These economists demonstrated that participation in ROSCA was not 
efficient as compare to saving alone and a random ROSCA gives the 
individual a higher ex-ante expected utility than formal financial sectors. 
What this means is that the association gives each of its participants except 
the last person on the rotation, the pot for the purpose of their participation 
sooner than they would save alone. However, some participants enjoy their 
purpose periods after, before others. And almost all the participants with 
the exception of the last one on the random rotation enjoy it earlier than 
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they would have saved. These participants would be strictly better off with 
the association and hence the association becomes inefficient.  
Besley et al., (1993) presented an economic framework for the analysis of 
ROSCA, which has become the required recommendation for economic 
analysis of ROSCA. This model developed by Besley et al., (1993) explain 
individuals’ decision to participate in the ROSCA and provide guidelines 
for choosing the duration and type of ROSCA. In the model developed by 
Besley et al., (1993) series of assumptions were made which include ROSCA 
members being risk averse, having identical preferences, perfect and 
complete information about the type of the other bidders. In addition, the 
size of the pool is assumed constant throughout the ROSCA and members 
are excluded from obtaining credit from other sources. In the setup of 
Besley et al., the pool of the ROSCA is equal to the price of an unspecified 
durable good and nondurables are assumed to be complementary.  
While arguing against the early pot motive, Gugerty (2007) argued that 
if the main motive for joining the ROSCA is due to its superior, then the 
last person on the rotation will not be better off by joining the association. 
He will leave the association. The second last person who now becomes the 
last person will decide the same and also leave the association since 
him/her will not be better off in joining the association. In his study, 
Gugerty (2007) shows ROSCA is for the purpose of buying divisible goods 
rather than indivisible goods.  
 
3.2. Net present value analysis and ROSCA participation  
Brink & Chavas (1991) used net present benefit analysis in choosing 
between ROSCA and saving against an interest and going for an interest-
bearing loan from a formal financial institution. Their illustrations are as 
follows:  
Let’s assume we have M individuals who wish to obtain an indivisible 
good A. The options open to them include joining a ROSCA group, 
borrowing an interest-bearing loan from the bank and saving alone 
(Autarky). In the ROSCA, M will be equivalent to the number of periods in 
the rotation and also the number of individuals in the rotation. We assume 
further that the indivisible good (B) yields benefit (b) in every period once 
it has been obtained by each individual (j). Therefore the net benefit of the 
ROSCA in period t for individual j will be given by:  
 
𝑌𝑗𝑡 𝑗𝑗 
 
Where c is the contribution one makes to the ROSCA whereas w is the 
overall income one obtain in each period. We will assume zero discount 
rate.  
The benefit to the first individual (J=1) will be obtained by adding:  
 
∑𝑀𝑡=1 𝑌1𝑡= ∑𝑀𝑡=1(𝑤 − 𝑐 + 𝑏) 
M (w-c + b) = M (w-c) + Mb. 
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The last person on the rotation only benefits from b in the last period. 
Therefore the total benefit of the last person on the circle is given by:  
 
∑𝑀𝑡=1 𝑌𝑀1=M (w – c) + b 
 
If j is the individual's rank in the rotation such that, 1 ≤ J ≤ M, Then 
generalizing net benefit of an individual with rank J is given by:  
 
M (w – c) + (M- J +1) b. 
 
Now, the per-capita benefit one will obtain from the ROSCA will be 
given by:  
 
 
 
Which will reduce to  
 
 
 
Now let’s consider saving against an interest being an alternative to 
ROSCA. Interest is assumed to be paid each period (that is no compound 
interest) so the total benefit of such savings for an individual j will be given 
by:  
 
 
 
Where r is the interest rate and c is the amount each individual saves at 
a particular point in time.  
The individual will prefer ROSCA to saving with an interest when   
 
 
 
That is  
 
b >rB  
 
Thus the benefit an individual in the ROSCA group obtain periodically 
after the indivisible good is attained needs to be sufficiently higher in 
relation to the interest on savings. If b >rB, it will imply that there are 
positive returns in joining the ROSCA. Thus ROSCA will be considered as 
Pareto superior to saving with the bank against interest.     
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Let's assume the next alternative of borrowing against an interest rate 
from the bank. So here the total repayment amount equals B + i (M-1) B. 
where i is the interest rate on credit. So the net benefit of an individual who 
goes in for such a loan will be M (w + b) – B- i (m-1) B. An average 
individual will prefer the ROSCA to the contracting of loan when;  
 
 
 
Given B = Mc, reduces to the following condition:  
 
b<2iB  
 
 Thus ROSCA will be preferred to borrowing against an interest if and 
only if the benefit obtained from acquiring the good is less than 2ib or the 
individual will go in for the loan if otherwise.  
In conclusion, we have established that an average individual in the 
ROSCA will choose ROSCA due to its profitability when the benefit he/she 
obtains after owning the indivisible good lies between rB and 2iB. That is, 
rB< b < 2iB.  
 
3.3. Transaction cost theory and ROSCA participation  
Adam Smith, in the classical school of thought, explained specialization, 
to be the determinant of the productivity level in an economy. 
Specialization, on the other hand, can be realized when there is an 
exchange which involves its own expense – a transaction cost (Coase, 1998). 
There is an inverse relationship between transaction cost and specialization 
or division of labour alongside productivity in an economy. Transaction 
cost depends positively on the existing institutions which include the legal, 
political, education and social system.  
According to the neoclassical economists, the efficient market works 
only when transaction costs are zero. Whenever there are transaction costs, 
then institution matters. This confirms the reason for the argument by New 
Institutional Economists (NIE) that institution matters in the world where 
much of the national income goes into transaction cost.  
The formation of the institution is underpinned by the transaction cost 
which in turn is dependent on the level of information completeness and 
the capacity of human beings to undergo the information processing. 
According to North (1995:2), ‚the cost of transaction arises because 
information is costly and asymmetrically held by the parties to exchange. 
The way of measuring the multiple valuable dimensions of the goods or 
services exchanged or of the performance of agents and the cost of 
enforcing agreement determines transaction cost‛. Hence institutions are 
built to reduce the level of uncertainty in an exchange.  
The individuals and the institution as a whole with a bargaining power 
as a result of the institutional framework have a crucial responsibility in 
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perpetuating the system. According to game theory, the probability of 
obtaining a cooperative solution will be high when there is a repetition of 
the game many times. This gives complete information about the 
performance of each player. If the game is not repeated by the players, then 
the gain from cooperation will be outweighed by the gain from defection. 
Hence it is the repetitive nature of ROSCA that renders its default rate to be 
low as well as its exchange cost (Gugerty, 2007).  
Institutions are made up ‚formal rules, informal norms, and the 
enforcement of characteristics of both‛ (North, 1995). And the combination 
of these three determines the performance of the economy. Sandsør (2010) 
states that low transaction cost, including low traveling cost and distance as 
well as low bureaucratic cost, are the basic characteristics of ROSCA. 
According to Geertz (1962) ROSCAs are institutions that show the 
transformation of a society from agrarian to commercial.  
Besley et al., (1993) in their seminal contribution developed a ROSCA 
theory by saying that, there is an inverse relationship between the size of 
ROSCA contribution and the size of ROSCA.  Thus when the size of 
ROSCA is large (a lot of members in the association), the size of ROSCA 
contribution is small (members contribute small amount) and the opposite 
is also true.  
 
3.4. Other theories of ROSCAs  
According to Besley et al., (1992) individuals who participate in ROSCA 
are credit constraint. Thus people who join ROSCA are mostly people who 
do not have access to the formal credit market. This may be as a result of 
lack of collateral security or inadequate availability of formal financial 
sectors.  
Ardener (1995) argues that where incomes are very low, where there is 
no formal social security network, where ill health stalks and a variety of 
calamities, however, a system of low cost, ROSCA helps to meet the 
challenges for all. She also believed that ROSCAs are informal finance 
mechanism that is predominantly used by the poor.   
Handa & Kirton (1999) disputed the fact that ROSCA participants are 
credit constrained as proposed by Besley et al. In trying to explain why 
wealthier individuals are members of ROSCA, they observed individuals 
who are unlikely to be credit constrained in the formal financial market and 
found out that, these individuals also part-take in ROSCA. Moreover, lack 
of assets for collateral is given as a reason why people should choose an 
informal finance mechanism (such as the ROSCA) over a formal financial 
institution.  
A theory that has also gone through viral empirical studies is the theory 
that, women are more likely to participate in ROSCA than men. At a 
theoretical level, Anderson & Baland (2002), rely on an intra-household 
conflict in consumption decision and of the existence of asymmetric 
preferences for household goods between men and women.   
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A theory regarding the link between ROSCA participation and durable 
goods acquisition was developed by Besley et al., (1993, 1994), they 
confirmed that, in a world where a number of individuals have an aim of 
acquiring an indivisible durable consumable good and has no access to 
external help or formal financial intermediation, ROSCA provide a good 
means of realising gains from inter-temporal trade.  
Gugerty (2007) postulated that what lures an individual in joining a 
ROSCA is the ability to save in an effective way rather than impatience. 
"Savings require self-discipline and ROSCA provides a collective 
mechanism for individual self-control in the presence of time-inconsistent 
preference and in the absence of alternative commitment technologies"  
Kedir et al., (2011) on theoretical grounds postulated that savings and 
deposits from an interest paying oriented bank provide a relatively lower 
yield, but a relative safer instrument of investment for poor people. On the 
other hand, random ROSCA is quiet riskier. The basic form of its riskiness 
is its lottery nature of given out pots to the lucky participants. Since no rate 
of interest is attached to savings associated with ROSCA, a late receipt of 
pot implies a loss of guaranteed interest income that a bank deposit would 
have granted. Also given borrowing constraint, an early ROSCA pay-out 
gives a major source of finance to a lumpy investment of capital goods, 
notwithstanding consumer durables. Thus ROSCA participation is riskier 
but gives higher yield, whereas investment in bank deposits is safe but its 
yields are lower.  
 Adams & de Sahonero (1989), Handa & Kirton (1999) made a theoretical 
postulation that, married women of middle age who have acquired at least 
basic education are more likely to be  
 
3.5. ROSCA participants 
Anderson & Baland (2002), Rutherford (2000), Vetrivel & 
Chandrakumaramangalam (2010) hypothesized that credit-constrained 
individuals are banned from the credit market because they lack a 
minimum starting budget. On the same line,  Besley et al., (1993), Levenson 
& Besley (1996), hypothesized that poor people are banned from formal 
credit market since they don't have collateral security to start with. So they 
should be motivated to participate in ROSCA than wealthier people.  
Recent studies by Kimuyu (1999) and Varadharajan (2004) suggest that 
the very poor people are less motivated to participate in ROSCA because 
they lack minimum starting budget.  
 
4. Some empirical studies  
Sandsør (2010) conducted empirical studies using data from Kibera 
slum. Among the 16 and older individuals in 511 households, resulting 
1270 observations, the percentage of the groups that have registered were 
reported to be only 10%. This means that majority of the ROSCA groups 
operate under illegal sense. About 98% of the leaders of the association 
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were elected and most of the association (about 91%) meets on a regular 
basis. 74% had penalties associated with not attending meetings. It was also 
reported that the probability of a ROSCA participant being a couple is high. 
And participants are also less likely to have completed primary school. 
Furthermore, it was reported that there exists a higher probability that a 
ROSCA participant is having a job.  
According to Vradharajan (2004) Whiles married individuals are more 
likely to participate in arisan. Highly educated individuals, on the other 
hand, had a significant and positive correlation with the arisan 
participation as compared to individuals with no education. In conclusion, 
he found that in Indonesia ROSCA are not necessarily meant for poor 
people, rather the rich have a higher probability of participating in ROSCA.  
Handa & Kirton (1999) conducted an econometric research on the 
economics of rotating savings and credit associations, where they took their 
evidence from Jamaica. They concluded that bankers of ROSCA in Jamaica 
are old, rich and have enough experience on the smooth running of the 
association. And payment to these bankers has a significant relation with 
the sustainability of the partner. Their analysis supported the theory that 
was postulated by Besley et al., (1993) that, there exists an inverse 
relationship between the size of the ROSCA and the periodic contribution 
of the association. 71% of their sample reported using their ROSCA 
winnings for the purchase of consumer durables. A significant proportion 
(14%) reported using their pot for precautionary savings for unplanned 
expenses.  
According to Dagnelie & Lemay‐Boucher (2012), empirical analysis by 
Handa & Kirton (1999) and Brink & Chavas (1991) agree with their 
evidence collected from a sample of 496 households in Cotonou, Benin that: 
ROSCA participants are mainly poor individuals who do not have enough 
access to formal institutions. Finally, they drew a conclusion that women 
are less likely to be a member of ROSCA than men in Cotonou: while men 
constitute 51% of all adult population, women being the minority 
constitute 45% of all ROSCA members. The likelihood for a woman to 
participate in ROSCA in Cotonou is 15%, this increases to 21% when she is 
married and 22% if she works (24% if she does both). Men have an overall 
probability of 19% of participating in ROSCA, 32% when they live as 
couples and 31% if working (35% if both). Their analysis also disagrees 
with the fact that, ROSCA participants are mainly women. 18% of all 
ROSCA surveyed were exclusively made up of women, whereas 26% were 
made up of men. And the remaining of the groups was made up of both 
men and women with 63% having a majority of male members.  
 
5. Methodology  
5.1. Data source  
Primary data was used for the study. The data was obtained from 
administering questionnaires to respondents and conducting interviews. 
Journal of Economics Library 
E. Amankwah, et al., 6(4), 2019, p.287-309. 
298 
298 
The questionnaire was administered to ROSCA participants, whereas in 
some cases, interviews were conducted.   
Target Population: The population of interest in relation to the primary 
data comprises of the total number of people living in the Asunafo North 
Municipality. According to population and housing census, the total 
population of the municipality is about 124,685. The population consist of 
people living in the areas of Goaso, Mim, Akrodie, Fawohyeden, Ayomso 
and their remote villages.  
 
5.2. Sample size   
The sample of the study was based on the residents of the municipality 
who were participants of ROSCAs. And the sample size was based on the 
Formula, 
 
 
 
Where,   
n₌ sample size  
N₌ Population          
α₌ 95% confidence interval.  
 
 
This is approximately 400  
 
5.3. Sample methods  
Both purposive and convenient sampling techniques were used in the 
study since the research was being constrained with time and resources. 
Purposive sampling technique is a non-random sampling technique which 
was used to select ROSCA participants for the study whereas the 
convenient sampling technique was also used to select respondents who 
were ready and in the position to respond to the questionnaire. With 
regards to the purposive and convenient sampling technique, the 
questionnaire was administered approximately for a period of 3 weeks to 
participants of ROSCA.   
 
5.4. Data collection instruments  
The instruments that were used in the primary data collection were 
questionnaires. Primarily, collection of data for the study was through 
administered questionnaire to ROSCA participants. But due to factors such 
as high illiteracy rate and the research being constrained with time, 
interviews and observations were somehow used at some point in time. 
The questionnaires administered were both open and closed ended 
questions. With the data collection, the researcher started from Goaso (the 
Municipal capital) to Akrodie, Fawohyeden, Ayomso and finally to Mim.   
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The questionnaire was made up three sections, the first section considers 
the basic characteristics of the individual participant. The second section 
considers the savings behaviour of the individual participants. And the 
final section considers the other questions which include the expenditure 
behaviour of the participants.  
The questions comprise of both structured and unstructured questions. 
The structured questions were straight forward with plausible answers in 
which respondents were asked to choose from and also dichotomous 
questions with two answers, yes or No. On the other hand, unstructured 
questions were used to acknowledge the genuine opinions of respondents 
on certain issues.  
 
5.5. The primary data estimation  
The researcher employed a binary Probit model in the analysis. The 
dependent variable (Y) was obtained when respondents were asked ‚why 
did you join the association?‛ the dependent variable (Y) took the value of 
one (1) if an individual participant joined the association because it 
shortens the time period he/she could have wait in case he was to save 
alone thereby making him/her better-off and zero if otherwise. The model 
specification is given by  
 
Pr (Y= 1) = Ø (𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑠𝑒𝑥+𝛽2𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙_ + 𝛽4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐_𝑙𝑒𝑣 +𝛽5 𝑒𝑚𝑝_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 
+𝛽6𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒+𝛽7𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_𝑠+𝛽8𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠+𝛽9𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡+𝛽10𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑏𝑙    (2)  
 
Where,  
* Ø is the commutative distribution function for the standard normal.  
* Sex is a dummy variable which represents either the person is a male or 
female (sex equals one if the participant is a female and zero if otherwise).  
* Age is the age of individual participants.  
* Marital_ is a dummy variable which represents the marital status of the 
participant (marital_ equals to one if the individual participant is married 
and zero if otherwise).  
* Educ_lev is a dummy variable which represents the educational level of 
individual participants (educ_lev equals one if individual participants’ 
level of education is low or if participants have no formal education and 
zero if otherwise).  
* Emp_stat is a dummy variable which represents the employment status of 
individual participant (emp_stat equals one if the individual participant is 
unemployed and zero if otherwise).  
* Income represents the income status of the participants.  
* Amount_s represents the amount saved out of income.  
* Access is a dummy variable which represents individual’s access to the 
formal financial institution.  
* Account is a dummy variable which represents whether the individual 
participant has an account with a formal financial institution or not 
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(account equals one if the individual has an account with a formal 
financial institution and zero if otherwise).  
* Valuable is a dummy which represents whether the individual has a 
valuable asset or not. This is also to tell us if the participant is rich or poor. 
Those with valuable assets were regarded as rich since assets measure 
permanent income and those without valuable assets were regarded as 
being poor. (Valuable equals one if respondents has valuable assets and 
zero if otherwise).   
 
6. Findings and discussions  
A probit model which is similar to what Varadharajan (2004) used in his 
analysis of ROSCA. The dependent variable took the value of one (1) if 
respondents join the association due to its Pareto superior allocation and 
zero if otherwise.  
 
Table 1. Probit regression  
Why ROSC Coef std. Err p˃z 
Age 0.0131938 0.0270168 0.625 
Sex -0.343009 0.6285642 0.956 
Marital_ 2.929124 0.8540669 0.001 
Educ_lev 5.003173 1.049289 0.000 
Emp_stat 3.641996 0.9019385 0.000 
Income -0.002045 0.0006618 0.002 
Amount_s 0.010330 0.0026165 0.000 
Access 0.294524 0.6356313 0.643 
Account -0.419420 0.5876568 0.475 
Valuable -0.631783 0.5160093 0.221 
_cons -11.4809 2,887353 0.000 
Source: Field surveyi 2017. 
 
Table 2. Marginal effect from the Probit estimates 
Variables (1) y l 
Age 0.000396 (0.000808) 
Sex -0.00102 (0.0189) 
Marital_ 0.0878*** (0.0219) 
Educ_lev 0.150*** (0.0169) 
Emp_stat 0.109*** (0.0192) 
Income -6.13e-05*** (1.71e-05) 
Amount_s 0.000310*** (6.05e-05) 
Access 0.00883 (0.0190) 
Account -0.0126 (0.0175) 
Valuable -0.0189 (0.0149) 
Observations 400 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Field survey, 2017. 
 
Table 2 above shows the results of the Probit model. The Probit model 
was used to analyse why respondents participate in ROSCA. The 
dependent variable took the value of one if respondents join the association 
because it shortens the time period they would have wait in case they were 
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to save alone thereby making each of them better off with the exception of 
the last one in the rotation who will be indifferent and zero if otherwise.   
Participants’ access to formal financial institutions was used as a 
measure of whether the participant lives in a rural area or an urban area in 
the municipality. Those who had access to formal financial institutions 
were classified as living in the urban areas in the municipality and those 
who don’t have access to formal financial institutions were classified as 
participants who live in the rural areas of the municipality. Again, 
participants were asked whether they have valuable assets or not. Since 
assets measure one’s permanent income level, respondents who answered 
yes were regarded as not being poor and those who answered no were 
regarded as being poor. With educational level, respondents were asked 
what their highest level of education was. Those with secondary/ 
vocational, HND/diploma, university, and professional qualification were 
classified as highly educated participants and those with no education and 
primary/JHS/middle were regarded as no or low level of education.  
Age, sex, whether participants have valuable assets and whether 
participants have accounts with formal financial institutions were not 
statistically significant, however, marital status, educational level, 
employment status, income levels, the amount saved out of income were 
statistically significant.  
Marital status, educational level, employment status, the amount saved 
out of income have a positive influence on the probability of predicting the 
superiority of ROSCA as a determinant of ROSCA participation. Income, 
on the other hand, has a negative influence in predicting  
Pareto superiority of ROSCA as a determinant of ROSCA participation. 
The Pseudo 𝑅2 of 0.9093 implies that about 90.93% of the variation in the 
decision to join ROSCA because of its Pareto superior allocation is jointly 
explained by the explanatory variables.  
Marital status is significant at 1% and it indicates that, when ROSCA 
participant is married, the probability that he/she joins ROSCA due to the 
fact that the association shortens the time period he/she could have wait in 
case they were to save alone thereby making each of them better off with 
the exception of the last one in the rotation who will be indifferent is 
explained by marital status. The marginal effect of marital status indicates 
that 1% increase in participants who are married will increase the 
probability of joining ROSCA due to its Pareto superior allocation by 
8.78%.   
Educational level is also significant at 1% and it indicates that, ROSCA 
participants who have no or low level of education are more likely to join 
the association due to its Pareto superior allocation. The marginal effect of 
educational level on the other hand indicates that 1% increase in ROSCA 
participants who have acquire low or no level of formal education will 
increase the probability of joining ROSCA due to its Pareto superior 
allocation by 15%.  
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Employment status and amount saved out of participants’ income are all 
significant at 1%. The marginal effect of employment status and amount 
saved out of participants’ income indicates that when ROSCA participant is 
unemployed and the amount he/she saves out of his/her income increases 
by 1%, the probability that he/she joins ROSCA due to its superior 
allocation will increase by 10.9% and 0.031% respectively.  
Finally, incomes of ROSCA participants are also significant at 1% and 
have a negative influence on predicting the superiority of ROSCA as a 
determinant of ROSCA participation.  
The marginal effect of income indicates that a unit increase in ROSCA 
participant’s income will decrease the decrease the probability of joining 
ROSCA due to its superior allocation by 3.72.  
Sex, age, whether individual participants have account with formal 
financial institutions or not, whether participants have valuable assets or 
not (rich or poor) and the probability that they join the association due to 
the fact that it shortens the time period they would have to wait in case 
they were to save alone, thereby making all of them better off with the 
exception of the last person on the rotation are independent. Thus whether 
the individual participant is a child, youth or aged doesn’t predict his/her 
vulnerability of joining the association because it gives Pareto superior 
allocation. Again, either the individual is a male or female doesn't predict 
his vulnerability of joining the association because it gives Pareto superior 
allocation. Finally, living in the rural or urban area and being rich or poor 
doesn't predict your vulnerability of joining the association due to its 
Pareto superior allocation.  
 
6.1. Qualitative analysis of ROSCA participants  
One of the qualitative analysis was based on why people join ROSCA. 
Respondents were given options to choose from which include; because it 
shortens the time period they would wait in case they were to save alone, 
because there is no formal financial in their community, because it serves as 
insurance, because they don’t have collateral to secure loan from formal 
financial institution and others.  
 
Table 3. Reasons why respondants join ROSCA  
Variable Frequency Percentage 
Why did you join the Association   
Because it shortens the time period I would wait in case I 
was to save alone 
287 71.75 
Because there is no formal financial institution in my 
community 
41 10.25 
Because anytime I am in need and it’s not even my turn in 
the rotation, I can be given the pot 
54 13.50 
Because I don’t have collateral to secure loan from the 
formal financial institution 
16 4 
Others 2 0.50 
Total 400 100 
Source: Field survey, 2017. 
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In Table 3 above, respondents were asked: ‚Why did you join the 
association‛. The options open to them were, because it shorten the time 
period the respondent would wait in case he/she was to save alone, because 
there is no formal financial institution in respondent’s community, because 
anytime they are in need and it’s not even their turn in the rotation they can 
be given the pot, because they do not have collateral security to secure loan 
from the formal financial institutions. Finally, respondents who did not see 
any of the reasons to be their prime reason for joining the association were 
to select the ‚others‛ and indicate their main reason if others.  
Out of the 400 respondents interviewed 71.75% (n=287) joined the 
association because it shortens the time period they would wait in case they 
were to save alone. 10.25% (n=41) joined the association because they do 
not have any formal financial institutions in their community. Also, 54 
respondents representing 13.50% joined the association because anytime 
they are in need and it’s not even their turn in the rotation, they can be 
given the pot. Sixteen (16) participants representing 4% joined because they 
don’t have collateral security to secure a loan from the formal financial 
institution, with two (2) participants having other reasons apart from the 
four reasons.  
 
6.2. Characteristics of ROSCA participants  
In achieving one of the specific objectives, the characteristics of ROSCA 
participants were reviewed.   
 
Table 4. Characteristics of ROSCA participants  
Variables Frequency Percentage 
Sex of respondents   
Male  107  26.75  
Female  293  73.25  
TOTAL  400  100  
Marital status of respondents  
Married  301  75.25  
Single  86  21.5  
Divorce  8  2  
Widow  5  1.25  
TOTAL  400  100  
Highest level of education of respondents   
Highly education  86  21.5  
Low or no level of education  314  78.5  
TOTAL  400  100  
Employment status of respondents   
Employed  65  16.25  
Unemployed  335  83.75  
TOTAL  400  100  
Criterion for allocating the pot   
Balloting  281  70.25  
Lottery  117  29.25  
Bidding  2  0.5  
TOTAL  400  100  
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How often respondents meet 
Weekly  309  77.25  
Monthly  91  22.75  
TOTAL  400  100  
Respondents access to formal financial institution 
Yes  269  67.25  
No  131  32.75  
TOTAL  400  100  
Do you have valuable assets 
Yes  173  42.25  
No  227  56.75  
TOTAL  400  100  
Do you receive financial assistance elsewhere 
Yes  233  58.25  
No  167  41.75  
TOTAL  400  100  
Relationship with the person 
Husband  124  53.22  
Wife  10  4.29  
Friend  22  9.44  
Relative  77  33.05  
TOTAL  233  100  
Do you have account with formal financial institution 
Yes  215  53.75  
No  185  46.25  
TOTAL  400  100  
Can there be change of order in time of need 
Yes  386  96.5  
No  14  3.5  
TOTAL  400  100  
Change of order of rotation after each round 
Yes  343  85.75  
No  57  14.25  
TOTAL  400  100  
Registration of the Association 
Yes  77  19.25  
No  323  80.75  
TOTAL  400  100  
Are there any written rules governing your association 
Yes  250  62.5  
No  150  37.5  
TOTAL  400  100  
Are there any penalties associated with not attending ROSCA meeting 
Yes  388  97  
No  12  3  
TOTAL  400  100  
Source: Field survey 2017. 
 
It can be discerned from 5.4 that, females constitute a greater portion of 
ROSCA participation. The results demonstrate that majority of the 
respondents 73.25% (n=293) are females whilst 26.75% (n=107) are males. 
This indicates that indeed females are more likely to participate in ROSCA 
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than males. This confirms the assertion made by Gugerty (2007) & 
Varadharajan (2004) that females are more likely to participate in ROSCA 
than males and disagrees with the assertion by Dagnelie & Lemay (2012) 
that, males are more likely to participate in ROSCA than females.  
In Table 4 above also gives the marital status of the 400 ROSCA 
participants interviewed.  
The majority of the participants are married. The percentage of 
participants who are married constituted 75.25% (n=301), those who are 
single constitute 21.5% (n=86) whilst 2% (n=8) and 1.25% (n=5) goes for 
divorce and widowed respectively. This confirms the findings by 
Varadharajan (2004) and Sandsør (2010) that married individuals are more 
likely to participate in ROSCA.  
 Respondents were asked what their highest level of education was. It 
can be ascended in Table 5.4 that, those with no level of education and 
primary/middle/JHS were regarded as having low or no level of education. 
On the other hand, participants with secondary/vocational, HND/diploma, 
university and professional education were regarded as being highly 
educated. From the table, those with no or low level of education constitute 
the majority 78.5% (n=314) of ROSCA participation whilst those with high 
level constituted 21.5% (n=86). This confirms the conclusion made by 
Sandsør (2010) that, ROSCA participants are less likely to acquire higher 
education. However, it disagrees with the findings by Lasagni & Lollo 
(2011) that ROSCA participants are highly educated.   
Table 4 above also shows the employment status of the ROSCA 
participants. Participants who are unemployed constitute the greater 
proportion of ROSCA participation. Out of 400 ROSCA participants, 
83.75% (n=335) are unemployed and do not receive any fixed amount of 
salary every month. But they are into farming, learning a trade, petty 
trading, and store keeping. However, those who had white colour jobs 
constituted 16.25% (n=65).  
Table 4 above also depicts the criterion used in the disbursement of 
ROSCA funds to its members. 70.25% (n=281) indicated that the criterion 
for their disbursement of fund to its members is through balloting, whilst 
29.25 (n=117) indicated that they used lottery as their major criterion for 
disbursement. 0.5% (n=2) indicated they use bidding as their criterion for 
disbursement of the fund.  Based on the available data, it was found out 
that most of the rotating savings and credit associations’ use balloting as 
their main criterion of disbursement of the fund as claimed by Owusu et al., 
(2013).  
 Respondents were asked how often they carried out their ROSCA 
meetings. The closed-ended options included daily, weekly, bi-weekly and 
monthly. It can be ascended from Table 5.9 that, out of the 400 respondents, 
77.25% (n=309) indicated that their ROSCA meetings are carried out on 
weekly basis whilst 22.75% (n=91) indicated that their meetings are carried 
out on monthly basis. No respondent indicated their meetings to be daily 
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and bi-weekly. This is to conclude that most of the rotating savings and 
credit associations meet on weekly basis to contribute to the pot.  
Table 4 also shows individual participants access to formal financial 
institutions. Those who have access to these institutions were classified as 
participants who live in the urban centres of the municipality and those 
without access were classified as those who live in the rural areas of the 
municipality. From the table, it can be seen that out of the 400 ROSCA 
participants, 67.25% (n=269) lived in the urban areas of the municipality 
whilst 32.75% (n=131) lived in the rural areas of the municipality. This gives 
an indication that people living in urban areas are also more likely to 
participate in ROSCA as indicated in the GLSS 6 report. It also confirms the 
assertion by Lasagni & Lollo (2011) that, ROSCA participation in urban 
villages are higher than ROSCA participation in rural villages and also 
confirms the postulation by Handa & Kirton (1999) that, ROSCA 
participants are not credit constrained as postulated by Besley et al., 
(1993,1994).   
Table 4 above also depicts the results when ROSCA participants were 
asked whether they have valuable assets. Assets as a measure of permanent 
income were used to measure the wealth of the participants. Those who 
answered yes are classified as not being poor and those who answered no 
are classified as being poor. Poor participants constitute the majority 
56.75% (n=227) whilst rich participants constitute 43.25% (n=173). This 
confirms the assertion by Dagnelie & Lemay (2012), and Varadharajan 
(2004)  that, poor people are more likely to participate in ROSCA.   
In Table 4, out the 400 ROSCA participants interviewed, the majority 
58.25% (n=233) receive financial assistance elsewhere. Whilst 41.75% 
(n=167) receive no financial assistance from anybody. This is to say that, 
people who participate in ROSCA receive extra financial support from 
other sources.     
Table 4 above also shows the relationship that exists between the 233 
ROSCA participants who receives financial assistance elsewhere. Greater 
proportion 53.22% (n=124) receive the financial assistance from their 
husbands, 33.05% (n=77) receive their financial support from their close 
relatives whilst 4.29% (n=10) and 9.44% (n=22) receive their financial 
supports from wife and friends respectively. This confirms the assertion by 
Gugerty (2007) that, married women are more likely to participate in 
ROSCA.   
Table 4 again demonstrates that a greater proportion of the ROSCA 
participants have an account with formal financial institutions. Out the 400 
participants interviewed, 53.75% (n=215) have an account with formal 
financial institutions, whilst 46.25% (n=185) do not have an account with 
any formal financial institutions. This is an indication that most of the 
people who have an account with formal financial institutions are also 
ROSCA participants. This confirms the claim by Handa & Kirton (1999) 
that ROSCA participants are not credit constrained.  
Journal of Economics Library 
E. Amankwah, et al., 6(4), 2019, p.287-309. 
307 
307 
In Table 4, 96.5% (n=368) answered yes to the question, "in the case of 
need, can a participant change his/her order of rotation". Whilst the 
remaining 3.5% (n=14) answered no. This supports the insurance motive of 
joining ROSCA postulated by Besley et al., (1992) and confirms the 
conclusion by Sandsør (2010) that, ROSCA helps in pooling resources to 
help participants who are in need.  
Respondents were also asked whether their association changes the 
order of rotation after each round. Table 4 also shows clearly the response 
of the respondents. Out of the 400 ROSCA participants, 85.75% (n=343) of 
the people answered yes whilst the remaining 14.25% (n=57) answered no. 
This is an indication that most of the ROSCA groups reverse their order of 
rotation after each round. This confirms the assertion by Sandsør (2010) 
that most of the ROSCA groups change their order of rotation after each 
round of the life of the association.  
It can be observed from Table 4 that, out of the 400 respondent 
interviewed, 80.75% (n=323) ROSCA participants reported that their 
association is not registered, whilst 19.25% (n=77) also reported that their 
association has been registered. This means that majority of the ROSCA 
groups operate in the illegal sense as concluded by Sandsør (2010).  
Respondents were asked whether they have written rules governing the 
association. Table 4 depicts the response of respondents. Out of the overall 
ROSCA participants, 62.5% (n=250) answered yes, whilst 62.5% (n=150) 
responded no. This is an indication that, most ROSCA groups have written 
rules governing their association.   
According to Table 4, out of the 400 ROSCA participants, 97% (n=388) 
answered yes to the question "Are there any penalties associated with not 
attending meetings", whilst 3% (n=12) answered no. this gives an indication 
that most of the ROSCA groups have penalties associated with not 
attending meetings which confirm the findings by Sandsør (2010).  
 
7. Conclusion  
 From the field survey analysis, the majority of ROSCA participants join 
the association because the association shortens the time period they would 
wait in case they were to save alone. It is recommended that ROSCA 
participants who have access to formal financial institutions (participants 
living in urban centres), participants who have accounts at formal financial 
institutions, participants who are rich and aged participants should be 
educated on how ROSCA constitutes its Pareto superior allocation.  
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